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The Myth of the Quietist Wittgenstein 
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock 
My father was a businessman, and I am a businessman; I want 
my philosophy to be business-like, to get something done, to get 
something settled.  
Wittgenstein, in conversation with Drury (Rhees 1991, 125) 
1. Metaphysics and scientism: the disease of philosophy and its source
Don’t think, but look! (PI §66) 
To say that Wittgenstein’s contribution to philosophy is not sufficiently recognised is an 
understatement. What should be said is that Wittgenstein is the first philosopher to have 
precisely diagnosed the disease of philosophy. The disease of philosophy is caused by its 
propensity to explain rather than describe – to think (that is, overthink) without looking (that 
is, without overlooking). In its efforts to look deeply, philosophy overlooks the surface, what 
is always before our eyes; and in its will to explain, it emulates explanation as practised by 
science:1 
Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce 
anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely 
descriptive’. (Think of such questions as ‘Are there sense data?’ and ask: What 
method is there of determining this? Introspection?) (BB 18) 
Explanation, when philosophy practises it, often results in metaphysics – that is, sublimated 
physics: the postulating of the basic entities and processes – such as sense data (or, more 
currently, internal representations) – that compose reality. So when philosophy emulates 
science, the ‘crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but as something concrete, indeed, as 
the most concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is’ (PI §97).2 Plato’s Forms, Aristotle’s 
form, Descartes’ Consciousness, Kant’s Pure Reason, Hegel’s Being and the early 
Wittgenstein’s Logical Form: 3  these are not offered as abstractions, but as hard crystals, 
allegedly ontologically robust entities, faculties, etc., that have crucially informed, or rather 
misinformed, philosophy throughout its history, perpetuating the explanatory, mythopoeic 
stance of the pre-Socratics. Plato reified predication, giving predicates existence, and indeed 
privileged existence. Aristotle corrected him, but got entangled in his own form. And so it goes. 
Wittgenstein properly diagnosed this metaphysical malady, and its source in scientism; and 
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against these he prescribed conversion to a method focused on description – one that engages 
looking rather than speculative thinking.  
Wittgenstein was not the first philosopher to distrust metaphysics. Notably Hume, 
incensed by the speculative metaphysics of his predecessors – ‘entirely hypothetical’, 
depending ‘more upon Invention than Experience’ (1932, 3.6) – engaged in a reform of 
philosophy: waging ‘war’ on ‘abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon that gets mixed up 
with popular superstition’ and replacing them with ‘accurate and valid reasoning’ (2007, 5).4 
However, Hume, even more than his predecessors, saw philosophy as an empirical science, 
and hoped that accurate description might, as in the sciences, 5  lead to explanation; that 
philosophy might get beyond the task of mere distinguishing and describing the operations of 
the mind, and ‘discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles’ – that is, the 
underlying causes – ‘by which the human mind is actuated in its operations’ (2007, 10). This 
shows Hume engaging an empirical battle against speculative metaphysics equipped with what, 
against all odds, is a metaphysical picture of the mind as something inner and hidden.  
Along with hiddenness hankering for disclosure, speculation and reification abound (cf. 
Hume 2007, 145). The mind has the traits of a metaphysical entity which is able to perceive 
and conjoin ideas while ‘thought is a faithful mirror that copies its objects truly’, if more faintly, 
than those in which our original perceptions were clothed (2007, 8). Moreover, Hume’s 
explanation of the operations of the mind is modelled on Newton’s explanation of the 
operations of gravitational attraction. Brandishing a theory borrowed from physics may not 
have been the best way to engage in a crusade against speculative metaphysics in the name of 
accurate description. Hume’s motivation was admirable and well-founded, but even he –
empiricist that he was – did not succeed in ridding himself of the metaphysical burden he was 
out to overthrow. Wittgenstein did. Like Hume, he believed that to understand our world, we 
must scrutinize it but, unlike Hume, the later Wittgenstein did not embark on his reflections 
about the human mind assuming it to be an inner, hidden entity whose ‘secret springs and 
principles’ needed to be discovered. Wittgenstein simply set about looking at the human mind 
in action – as something that is always before our eyes and of which we need not hypothesize 
the existence of ghostly processes. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on behaviour and perspicuous 
presentation, and his rejection of ghostly inner processes as superfluous and misleading 
explanations, all point to his having cured himself of speculative, explanatory metaphysics – 
the disease of philosophy. 
But the Galilean revolution that Wittgenstein should have sparked in philosophy is still 
slow in coming, even if signs of it are afield in the ‘the e-turn’ in philosophy (Enactivism, 
Embodiment, Embeddedness and Extensiveness), which his work has prompted and fostered.6 
I believe this slowness is much due to the fact that Wittgenstein has been championed, and 
therefore generally perceived, as a quietist philosopher: a philosopher whose aim is to dissolve 
rather than solve problems, and whose stance towards matters philosophical and non-
philosophical is one of non-interventionism.  What I would like to do in this paper is to extricate 
Wittgenstein from the quietist and reductively therapeutic image that has overshadowed him, 
by showing in what ways he was an interventionist philosopher – a philosopher who wanted to 
change things – both within philosophy and for the sciences. 
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2. The Therapeutic Wittgenstein and quietism 
 
In her Introduction to The New Wittgenstein, Alice Crary affirms that ‘Wittgenstein’s primary 
aim in philosophy is ... a therapeutic one’ – that is, he advocates philosophy as a form of therapy 
whose goal is to ‘help us work ourselves out of confusions we become entangled in when 
philosophizing’ (Crary 2001, 1). On this view, philosophical problems are considered to be 
nothing but illusions, and philosophy’s aim is to get us to recognize those illusions for what 
they are, which should lead to their dissolution, and not to their solution (for they should not 
be envisaged as solvable by argument or reasoning). The real work that has to be done is not 
on philosophy, but on oneself, on one’s own confusion (cf. CV 24). Indeed, on this reductively 
therapeutic (henceforth, referred to simply as Therapeutic) reading of Wittgenstein, 7  the 
Tractatus is a hoax meant to deceive us into thinking it is offering the solution to the problems 
of philosophy, only to disabuse us (TLP 6.54) and thereby cure us of the temptation to believe 
that there are solutions to metaphysical problems and that there are legitimate philosophical 
problems.8 This account of the Tractatus is the most spectacular deus ex machina I know of in 
philosophy. 
The trouble with Therapeutism is that it gives all of Wittgenstein’s philosophy an 
exclusively deconstructive or negative burden; it limits the possibilities of his philosophical 
method to the point of deforming it – as it does the Tractatus – by forcing it to fit into this 
exiguous mould. 9  Although this reading has lost much of its credibility amongst 
Wittgensteinians, the image of a merely therapeutic and ideologically quietist Wittgenstein is 
still potent: it informs the popular as well as the philosophical mainstream perception of 
Wittgenstein, and remains resonant in some Wittgensteinian quarters. Witness the recent 
publication of Paul Horwich’s Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy where it is still claimed that, on 
Wittgenstein’s view, the philosopher’s job is to remove the confusion responsible for 
misguided philosophical arguments, but that once this is done, we are not left ‘with any positive 
new theory or new understanding’:  
 
‘The net result will be simply that we have cured ourselves of a particular tendency to 
get mixed up […] The most we can hope for is the elimination of our traditional 
concerns’ (Horwich 2012, 6; 20 my emphasis)  
 
This is precisely the kind of quietism that has been wrongly, and nefariously, pinned on 
Wittgenstein. His was a more proactive stance: he did not only uphold the dissolution of 
problems but their solution; not only demystification but positive understanding. Horwich's 
Wittgenstein makes the philosopher at best a cured individual with nothing more to offer: all 
she can do is sit back in the hope that all other philosophers have undergone the same 
conversion. Yet Wittgenstein did not sit back. He taught and wrote philosophy. He tried to find 
ways of imparting his findings, clarifying them through argument and example, and showing 
how and where the disease strikes and how to go about fighting it (e.g. OC §37). He gave 
philosophers instructions (e.g., ‘We must do away with all explanation, and description alone 
must take its place’ (PI §109)) and showed them where they go wrong, for example, when 
explaining Moore’s mistake of talking of knowing in cases where doubt would not be possible 
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(OC §178). Wittgenstein did not hesitate to correct  – e.g., ‘I should like to say: Moore does 
not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as 
absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and inquiry’ (OC §151). He also replaced 
metaphysical explanation – say, of meaning – with down-to-earth description: 
 
It looks to us as if we were saying something about the nature of red in 
saying that the words ‘Red exists’ do not yield a sense. Namely, that red does 
exist ‘in its own right’. The same idea—that this is a metaphysical statement 
about red—finds expression again when we say such a thing as that red is 
timeless, and perhaps still more strongly in the word ‘indestructible’.  
But what we really want is simply to take ‘Red exists’ as the statement: the 
word ‘red’ has a meaning. (PI §58) 
 
It should now be clear that when Wittgenstein writes that ‘philosophy may in no way 
interfere with the actual use of language’ (PI §124) – the phrase that is singly mostly 
responsible for his being called a quietist – this does not mean that it should not correct 
philosophical use when it goes awry, but only that it should not interfere with the actual or 
ordinary use of language. 10  Wittgenstein’s non-interventionism concerns only ordinary 
language – which does not imply that ordinary language may not eventually be impacted by 
philosophical clarification.11 
 Wittgenstein clearly engages in more than self-therapy and urges us to do the same: 
‘The danger sets in when we notice that the old model is not sufficient but then we don’t change 
it’ (BT 318). Because of its misleading uniformity, language can lead us astray. It is the 
philosopher’s task to ‘show differences’, to work ‘against the myth-forming tendencies’ (MS 
158, p. 49) and ‘the misleading analogies in the use of language’ (PO 163). 
 
3 The importance of conceptual / grammatical elucidation  
 
The philosophical problem is an awareness of disorder in our concepts, and can be 
solved by ordering them. (BT 309) 
 
Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy as conceptual or grammatical elucidation12 is rooted in the 
realization that what we, in our scientistic attitudes, have traditionally taken to be metaphysical 
problems are nothing but linguistic confusions: ‘The characteristic of a metaphysical question 
being that we express an unclarity about the grammar of words in the form of a scientific 
question’ (BB 35). This is why, in keeping with Wittgenstein’s ‘modern’ way of philosophizing 
(MWL 113), the philosopher should rid herself of the urge to approach problems scientifically, 
and engage in the task of conceptual elucidation and rearrangement which alone can ‘bring 
words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’ (PI §116):     
  
It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. … 
And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, 
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and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, 
that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of 
course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the 
workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize 
those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems 
are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have 
always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language. (PI §109) 
 
 Wittgenstein insists that a main source of philosophical problems is linguistic: 
philosophical problems occur when ‘language goes on holiday’ (PI §38): 
 
Philosophical troubles are caused by not using language practically but by 
extending it on looking at it. We form sentences and then wonder what they 
can mean. Once conscious of ‘time’ as a substantive, we ask then about the 
creation of time. (AWL 15) 
 
It is crucial that we not underestimate, as is often done by Wittgenstein’s detractors, the damage 
produced by conceptual confusion and the related importance of conceptual elucidation.13 Tim 
Crane, for example, thinks some of these ‘supposed [intellectual] confusions’ to be ‘so banal 
that it is quite incredible that any serious thinker should be taken in by them’ and he dismisses 
the linguistic nature of philosophical confusion:  
 
[T]o ask whether time flows (for example) is not to suffer from any kind 
of intellectual disease which is in need of therapy; it is not to have your 
intelligence bewitched by language; it is not to misunderstand what 
Wittgenstein called the ‘grammar’ of the word time. Rather, it is to grapple 
with questions that are at once simple to grasp – what is it for some things to 
be in the past, and some in the future? – and also of great complexity: how 
our actual temporal experience of the world is related to the picture of time 
and space that we have acquired from physics. (2016) 
 
Note that Wittgenstein would not be averse to grappling precisely the questions Crane 
lists here; what he is really worried about in the AWL passage – and Crane fails to address – is 
the worry that because of language (i.e. ‘time’ being a substantive), we are confused into 
thinking that time is a thing (and therefore ask about its creation). As Wittgenstein makes clear: 
 
[I]t is the use of the substantive ‘time’ which mystifies us. If we look into 
the grammar of that word, we shall feel that it is no less astounding that man 
should have conceived of a deity of time than it would be to conceive of a 
deity of negation or disjunction. (BB 6) 
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Such mystification – often, as here, in the form of reification – is neither rare nor of 
superficially linguistic importance. Because they are substantives, we are mystified into taking 
‘time’, but also ‘mind’, ‘memory’ or ‘consciousness’, to be full-blown entities having discrete 
existence and location. Because ‘consciousness’ is a noun, we think it must stand for a 
nominatum – a thing it names. Also, it is all too tempting a step to infer, from the fact that we 
are sometimes conscious, the existence of an entity called consciousness. This out-dated residue 
of the Platonic reification of states and qualities has been blown out of all proportion, the 
problem of consciousness being ‘arguably the most central issue in current philosophy of mind’ 
– consciousness being viewed by many philosophers as a physical entity that can only be 
understood by investigating the brain.14 
 The attempt to capture the human person in microphysics has plagued philosophy since, 
perhaps, the pre-Socratics (the atomists), but it seems to me more pervasive today than it has 
ever been. Raymond Tallis invokes the current ‘neuromania’, as he calls it, ‘based on the 
incorrect notion that human consciousness is identical with activity in the brain, that people are 
their brains, and that societies are best understood as collections of brains’, rightly adding that 
‘while the brain is a necessary condition of every aspect of human consciousness, it is not a 
sufficient condition – which is why neuroscience, and the materialist philosophy upon which 
it is based, fail to capture the human person’ (2012). Indeed, in its attempts to find the ghost in 
the machine, philosophical neuromania has even found its way to the Scientific American in 
the guise of ‘experimental philosophy’: ‘Some philosophers today’ – reads the headline in that 
journal – ‘are doing more than thinking deeply. They are also conducting scientific experiments 
relating to the nature of free will and of good and evil’ (Knobe 2011, 39). The article is entitled 
‘Thought Experiments’, punning on the fact that the thought experiments conducted by 
philosophers these days tend to emphasize the ‘experiment’ rather than the ‘thought’.  
When philosophers like Crane object that reification – being nothing but an innocuous, 
figurative way of speaking – does not mystify us, they are wrong: reification often impacts and 
reflects our understanding of some mental concepts as physical entities or places in the brain. 
Of course, this is not dismissive of reification; it only flags our vulnerability to it. Crane’s 
suggestion that we should accept transfers and extensions of meaning as part of the essence of 
our language (2015, 258) is platitudinous: Wittgenstein is only combating the extensions that 
are taken literally. As Peter Hacker aptly quips, there is ‘nothing wrong with talking about the 
foot of a mountain – as long as one does not wonder whether it has a shoe’ (Bennett et al, 2007, 
154). John Searle’s suggestion that human beings are ‘embodied brains’ (Bennett et al, 2007, 
120f) does not smack of the innocuously figurative. Such figurative expressions can mislead 
us into thinking that a problem is a scientific one when in fact it is not. Scientism can mystify 
us in different ways, mostly through the uncritical adoption of scientific ways of thinking and 
images, and their systematic transfer and application to realms outside science.15  
Conceptual confusions such as these are far from trivial in that, like all our unquestioned 
assumptions and many of our powerful pictures, they by default inform empirical research. 
Taking the mind and the brain as synonyms or as co-extensive has repercussions on how we 
conduct research on and treat mental illness; for example, by privileging – through 
acknowledgment, reward and funding – the physiological approach which de-contextualizes 
psychiatric disorders and treats them as discrete, drug-treatable, brain conditions rather than as 
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products of nurture which deserve increased attention and funding. In calling attention to 
grammatical mystification generally, Wittgenstein also called particular attention to the 
absence of clarity which has often led the empirical and human sciences astray for centuries.  
 The scientist crafts new theories about the natural world by using accumulated data, as 
well as the resources of her laboratory often supplemented by those of her imagination. But in 
crafting her theories, she is not always linguistically circumspect; indeed, often, as Wittgenstein 
puts it, her ‘mouth simply runs’: 
   
In a scientific investigation we say all sorts of things, we make many statements 
whose function in the investigation we don’t understand. For not everything is said with 
a conscious purpose; our mouth simply runs. We move through conventional thought 
patterns, automatically perform transitions from one thought to another according to the 
forms we have learned. And then finally we must sort through what we have said. We 
have made quite a few useless, even counter-productive motions and now we must 
clarify our movements of thought philosophically. (RPP ii, 155) 
 
 Philosophers are supposed to be the professionals of clarity, and so rather than 
unquestioningly adopting ‘the picture of time and space ... acquired from physics’ (Crane, 
2016) or the picture of memory acquired from neuropsychology, they must conceptually 
investigate those pictures to ensure that the scientist enter the lab with clear concepts.16 There 
is no scientific investigation that is not informed by language, and it is the philosopher’s task 
to ensure that the scientist is as conceptually well-equipped as possible, both by correcting 
scientists’ inapt concepts and replacing them with apt ones. 
 Wittgenstein’s new method of philosophising aims to get philosophers to realise the 
detrimental consequences of being bewitched by language; to stop taking that seemingly 
innocuous step of turning a quality into a thing and then examining it as if it were a thing. In 
response to Crane’s dismissal of the value of this method and his urge that we stick to 
traditional philosophy as a ‘straightforwardly intellectual endeavour in pursuit of the truth’, 
one must ask what that has brought us in the past two thousand years? How has philosophy, as 
the ‘attempt to answer certain abstract questions which have arisen in the history of human 
thought in various forms, provoked by various kinds of speculation’ (Crane 2016), brought us 
anything but universal disagreement on these questions and on the nature of the concepts it 
abstractly investigates? This scientistic view of philosophy as a discipline that, continuous with 
science, adds to our knowledge about such things as time or the mind or consciousness has 
proved a failure. It’s time to move on.   
 How rife the confusion is about the nature of philosophy is evidenced by the current 
feud on the uselessness of philosophy, which shows up the confusion about its dividing line 
with science. Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow’s claim that because ‘philosophers 
have not kept up with modern developments in science’ ‘philosophy is dead’, and scientists 
have become the sole ‘bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge’, evinces 
the currency of the view that philosophy is meant to add to our knowledge (Hawking and 
Mlodinow 2010, 13). But as Wittgenstein makes clear, it is a crucial misconception to see 
philosophers as involved in the quest for knowledge at all. Philosophy’s role is not to bring us 
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new knowledge but to set us on the clear path to knowledge: ‘One might also give the name 
"philosophy" to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions’ (PI §126). This 
enables us to realise that the fact that science progresses and philosophy does not – at least 
where knowledge is concerned – is neither a sad state of affairs nor a slur on philosophy, but 
precisely the way things ought to be.  
 In reaction to the proclamation that philosophy is dead, physicist Victor Stenger argues 
that when physicists take ‘their equations and models as existing on one-to-one correspondence 
with the ultimate nature of reality’, they are engaging in a grand philosophical tradition – 
namely that of Plato – and this ‘makes them philosophers, too’ (Stenger 2015). The problem 
though is that Stenger comes to such a conclusion only because he takes metaphysics to be 
bona fide philosophy – an assumption that Wittgenstein seeks to correct. Understanding that 
metaphysics is in fact pseudo-science in philosophy’s clothing helps clarify the boundary line 
between science and philosophy. 
 Stenger’s (misguided) praise notwithstanding, philosophy’s far from glowing record in 
intellectual usefulness is, I believe, warranted: although philosophers have achieved some great 
insights, they have also largely contributed to conceptual confusion and dispute. But I also 
believe Wittgenstein has given us the tools to make that right. Those tools are conceptual 
elucidation and perspicuous presentation. However, on Wittgenstein’s view, the philosopher 
does not wield them – as Locke would have it – as an ‘under-labourer... removing some of the 
rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge’, but as an indispensable, proactive, guide to 
understanding:  
   
What is it ... that a conceptual investigation does? Does it belong in the 
natural history of human concepts? – Well, natural history, we say, describes 
plants and beasts. But might it not be that plants had been described in full 
detail, and then for the first time someone realized the analogies in their 
structure, analogies which had never been seen before? And so, that he 
establishes a new order among these descriptions. He says, e.g., ‘compare 
this part, not with this one, but rather with that’ ... and in so doing he is not 
necessarily speaking of derivation; nonetheless the new arrangement might 
also give a new direction to scientific investigation. He is saying ‘Look at it 
like this’ – and that may have advantages and consequences of various kinds. 
(RPP i, 950)  
 
And so, pace Horwich (2012, 6), on Wittgenstein’s view, the philosopher’s perspicuous 
presentation can bring new understanding – only let’s not confuse that with knowledge.  
 
4 Re-arranging the familiar: philosophy as perspicuous presentation 
 
The Wittgensteinian philosopher differs from scientists and metaphysicians:   
 
9 
 
[I]t is … of the essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new 
by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what 
we seem in some sense not to understand’ (PI §89) 
 
What is in plain view remains misunderstood, or hidden to us, because its simplicity and 
familiarity have rendered it invisible (PI §129). Once made surveyable by the philosopher’s 
‘new order’, rearrangement or ‘perspicuous presentation’ (PI §122), we are then ‘struck by 
what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful’ (PI §129).  
But there are many ways of ordering concepts so that they show themselves in their 
clearest light, and Wittgenstein is not innocent of the most ‘conservative’ kind of elucidation, 
which is classification. He goes about it relentlessly in the Remarks on Philosophical 
Psychology, with variants in Zettel: 
 
Plan for the treatment of psychological concepts. 
Psychological verbs characterized by the fact that the third person of the 
present is to be identified by observation, the first person not. 
Sentences in the third person of the present: information. In the first person 
present, expression. ((Not quite right.)) 
Sensations: their inner connexions and analogies. 
All have genuine duration. Possibility of giving the beginning and the end. 
Possibility of their being synchronized, of simultaneous occurrence. (RPP ii, 
63) 
 
Continuation of the classification of psychological concepts. 
Emotions. Common to them: genuine duration, a course. (Rage flares up, 
abates, vanishes and likewise joy, depression, fear.) 
Distinction from sensations: they are not localized (nor yet diffuse!). 
Common: they have characteristic expression-behaviour. (Facial 
expression.) And this itself implies characteristic sensations too. Thus sorrow 
often goes with weeping, and characteristic sensations with the latter. (The 
voice heavy with tears.) But the sensations are not the emotions. (RPP ii, 148) 
 
Here, we find Wittgenstein classifying psychological concepts such as emotions and sensations 
– he will also do moods – according to certain characteristics like localization and duration. He 
even goes in for subclasses, distinguishing directed from undirected emotions. A real taxonomy 
is developed. In many of these remarks we also see Wittgenstein go for generalizations and the 
stating of necessary conditions: 
 
Do not forget: sight, smell, taste etc. are sensations only because these 
concepts have something in common – as one might take auger, chisel, axe, 
oxyacetylene torch together, because they have certain functions in common. 
(RPP i, 782)  
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The general differentiation of all states of consciousness from dispositions 
seems to me to be that one cannot ascertain by spot-check whether they are 
still going on. (RPP ii, 57)  
 
Emotional attitudes (e.g. love) can be put to the test, but not emotions. (RPP 
ii, 152)  
 
Far from the non-committal stance of a philosopher intent only on dissolving and not 
reordering, and above all not looking for the right or ‘correct’ order, Wittgenstein speaks here 
of ‘the correct’ treatment’ (RPP ii, 311). The correct classification of these phenomena can 
alone can bring understanding: 
 
Don’t put the phenomenon in the wrong drawer. There it looks ghostly, 
intangible, uncanny. Looking at it rightly, we no more think of its intangibility 
than we do of time’s intangibility when we hear: ‘It’s time for dinner.’ 
(Disquiet from an ill-fitting classification.) (RPP i, 380; emphasis added)  
 
Meaning, again, that there is a right-fitting classification:17 ‘one has got to master the kinships 
and differences of the concepts’ (RPP i, 1054). It is the philosopher’s responsibility to 
scrutinise ill-fitting classifications (such as speaking of knowing as a state rather than a 
disposition) that lead to misleading pictures of the phenomena.  
Philosophical classifications are not – as in science – derived from observation of the 
phenomena, but from ways of speaking about the phenomena. This is what makes the 
investigation conceptual rather than empirical. It does not, however, lead to linguistic 
reductivism or linguistic idealism18; for what we say, how we speak about phenomena, is going 
to be impacted by how things are. This impact is twofold: causal and logical. Wittgenstein 
makes clear that inasmuch as the philosopher is doing conceptual elucidation, the causal aspect 
of this correspondence should not concern her – ‘our interest does not fall back on ... possible 
causes’ (RPP i, 146) – for she is concerned only by the logical (or grammatical) relation – that 
is, what it makes sense to say.19 This is where Wittgenstein is often accused of reducing our 
conceptions of the world to linguistic projections unattached to the world – a form of linguistic 
idealism or reductivism. The accusation, however, is unwarranted. In clarifying our concepts, 
Wittgenstein cannot be accused of linguistic idealism, for our concepts are inextricably 
(logically) connected to our practices, behaviour and form(s) of life:20 ‘The concept of pain is 
simply embedded in our life in a certain way’ by a set of ‘very definite connexions’ (RPP II, 
150). So an investigation’s being grammatical or conceptual does not mean it is unrelated to 
reality. Much of our grammar is conditioned, non-ratiocinatively infused, by facts (OC §558); 
it is what we might call reality-soaked or thick grammar21. 
 Language does not articulate a form of life independent of it, but rather carries and 
partly constitutes the human form of life. What we say is inextricably, internally, related to 
what we do, what we are and the world we live in. This should confirm the importance of the 
linguistic turn in philosophy – the importance of turning our attention to the linguistic nature 
of much of reality and to the reality-soaked nature of much of language. 
11 
 
 
5. ‘A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar’ (PI, p. 222) 
 
On Wittgenstein’s view, in elucidating the grammar of love – that is, in clarifying what can 
and cannot be said about love – a philosopher elucidates what love is. But we must remember 
that by this is meant elucidating only its logical nature: e.g., is love a feeling or an emotion or 
an emotional attitude? In adequately examining the grammar of love, the philosopher arrives 
at a perspicuous presentation or classification of the concept of love. 22  For example, his 
reminder that as it is nonsensical to speak of love as something that can last a minute, love 
cannot logically be classified as an emotion or a feeling, but it can be an emotional attitude:23  
 
Emotional attitudes (e.g. love) can be put to the test, but not emotions. (RPP 
ii, 152) 
 
Love is not a feeling. Love is put to the test, pain not. One does not say: 
‘That was not true pain, or it would not have gone off so quickly.’ (Z §504) 
 
Of course, as indicated above, the phenomena – in this case, human behaviour – will have 
impacted our grammar of love and pain. But the philosopher is investigating the concepts, not 
the phenomena; although in so doing, she is in touch with the phenomena.  
 The logical status of ‘what can be said’ about phenomena is due to our agreement here 
not being one in opinion or observation, but in form of life.24 Unlike science, where agreement 
is (at least sought to be) established objectively – derived from and justified by observation – 
our agreement in grammar, in what makes sense, is due to convention, unconcerted agreement. 
Although not objective, this agreement is indisputable: any competent speaker of English must 
find nonsensical to speak of love as something that can last a minute or of pain as something 
that cannot. This is something it is not possible to debate, because everyone would agree to it 
(cf. PI §128).  
 But what of the grammars of mind and brain? Can we arrive at a classification that 
everyone would agree to? Indeed, why suggest their alleged synonymy is nonsensical or idle 
in the first place when it constitutes the bread and butter of so many philosophers? Well, 
because it results from the metaphysical urge to look for ‘something that lies beneath the 
surface’ (PI §92) and the scientistic urge to posit ghostly inner processes.25 Because ‘instead of 
simply saying what anyone knows and must admit’, such philosophers are constructing ‘a myth 
of mental processes’ (Z §211).  The same goes for remembering:  
 
If someone asks me what I have been doing in the last two hours, I answer 
him straight off and I don’t read the answer off from an experience I am having. 
And yet one says that I remembered, and that this is a mental process. (RPP i, 
105) 
 
One might also marvel that one can answer the question "What did you do 
this morning?" – without looking up historical traces of activity or the like. 
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Yes; I answer, and wouldn’t even know that this was only possible through a 
special mental process, remembering, if I were not told so. (RPP i, 106) 
 
The perspicuous philosophical description here, to which everyone would agree, is ‘I answer 
straight off and don’t read the answer off from an experience I am having’. Anything more is 
speculative explanation characteristic of the ‘elves in the basement’ mentality.26 To break the 
hold of those captivating but imperspicuous pictures of the mind, the philosopher must filter 
out their tendentious and explanatory overlay, and remind us of the unrecognised obvious27: i.e. 
the mind is a set of capacities.28  
The peril of scientism is that it encourages people to think that, in order to be adequate, 
explanations must be theoretical and deep (that is, distant from what we ordinarily think, say 
or do); and that not giving such deep theoretical explanations is a sign of epistemic 
incompetence. As Wittgenstein writes: 
 
If, for instance, you ask, ‘Does the box still exist when I’m not looking at it?’, the only 
right answer would be ‘Of course, unless someone has taken it away or destroyed it’. 
Naturally, a philosopher would be dissatisfied with this answer, but it would quite 
rightly reduce his way of formulating the question ad absurdum. (PR 88) 
 
6. Wittgenstein as armchair scientist: theorizing, of a kind 
 
‘In order to climb into the depths one does not need to travel very far; no, for that you do not 
need to abandon your immediate and accustomed environment’ (RPP i, 361) 
 
Does Wittgenstein believe that the only legitimate philosophical preoccupation with reality is 
a preoccupation with language? He seems adamant that empirical facts about language are 
irrelevant to philosophers: 
 
We are not interested in any empirical facts about language, considered as 
empirical facts. ... I am only describing language, not explaining anything. (PG 
30) 
 
An explanation of the operation of language as a psychophysical 
mechanism is of no interest to us. (PG 33) 
 
How language acts on us or the way we acquire language fall outside the purview of 
grammatical elucidation:  
 
Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfil its 
purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes 
and in no way explains the use of signs (PI §496) 
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In grammatical investigation, the criteria for whether a language is understood are unaffected 
by the way language was acquired, whether through teaching or not (BB 12). And so, ‘teaching 
as the hypothetical history of our subsequent actions (understanding, obeying, estimating 
length, etc.) drops out of our considerations’ (BB 14).   
 But, in fact, teaching does not drop out of Wittgenstein’s considerations: remarks on 
the genesis of language and on language-acquisition abound in his work.29 So either this is a 
contradiction in Wittgenstein or what he says regarding the irrelevance of empirical facts about 
language applies only to the philosopher engaged in conceptual elucidation; but conceptual 
elucidation is not all that the philosopher engages in. I now briefly explore this. 
 Some of Wittgenstein’s remarks are clearly in the form of hypotheses on how language 
is learned. Here is a familiar one:  
    
How does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? – 
of the word ‘pain’ for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected 
with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their 
place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and 
teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-
behaviour. (PI §244) 
 
Here Wittgenstein offers, on the basis of empirical observation, a possible explanation for how 
we acquire the meaning of the names of sensations. Is this not armchair learning theory? Such 
passages give the legitimate impression that Wittgenstein sometimes comes to conclusions 
about language acquisition from observation, and so is advancing theses or explanations. 
Indeed, for David Pears, ‘a cardinal thesis of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy [is] that language 
is built on a pre-existing structure of related perceptions and actions’ – a thesis which relies on 
his examination of the pre-linguistic systems on which any language must be based (Pears 
1995, 418, 412). Could it be, as Pears also wonders, that in spite of drawing a firm line between 
philosophy and scientific inquiry, Wittgenstein found himself inevitably trespassing on the 
forbidden ground? Does Wittgenstein’s use of the terms ‘primitive’ and ‘natural’, for example, 
belong to a theory of language acquisition? Keith Dromm does not think so:  
 
[W]e need not understand Wittgenstein to be making empirical claims – let alone 
offering a full-blown linguistic theory – in his later writings. Instead … these terms 
[‘natural’ and ‘primitive’] belong wholly to the type of conceptual investigation that 
Wittgenstein pursues in those writings.’ (Dromm 2003, 675) 
 
In fact, however, Wittgenstein’s use of ‘natural’ and ‘primitive’ is not wholly conceptual; he 
also applies these terms ontogenetically and in such cases, there is an empirical description of 
language acquisition which leads to a conclusion.30 
 I think it would be a mistake to call scientific – armchair or otherwise – the kind of 
simple explanation Wittgenstein offers in PI §244. Armchair science is usually defined as the 
endeavour to find truths about the world without direct observational or experimental input 
(Northcott & Alexandrova 2014), sometimes through analysis or synthesis of existent 
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scholarship, sometimes by sheer intuition or reflection. It characterises a large part of scientific 
modelling. The kind of explanation Wittgenstein engages in is not of this ilk: his is a simple, 
straightforward conclusion drawn from the lucid scrutiny of basic facts – a perspicuous 
presentation of what is always before our eyes. We might say, then, that here Wittgenstein’s 
perspicuous presentations of what we say extend to perspicuous presentations of what we do. 
His basic empirical ‘explanations’ are but presentations drawn from surveying our basic ways 
of acting, arranging what we have always seen in a more perspicuous light. 
 As Oswald Hanfling reminds us, there are several senses of ‘theory’ (Hanfling 2004, 
187), and one of these may well apply to what Wittgenstein is doing, in spite of his injunction 
at PI §109. Wittgenstein’s explanations or theories are not of the kind he denies philosophy. 
The latter, are rightly described by Horwich as hypotheses about some non-evident reality: 
attempts to unearth facts that are not out in the open; that cannot be discerned merely by looking 
in the right direction with an unprejudiced eye and a clear head (Horwich 2012, 64). In contrast, 
Wittgenstein’s explanations result from observations of what ‘in our your immediate and 
accustomed environment’ (RPP i, 361), is plainly before our eyes, from observations so candid 
and unadulterated by assumptions (‘Don’t think, but look!’) that ‘everyone would agree with 
them’. Indeed, one would think that Wittgenstein’s thesis, as Pears calls it, that ‘language is 
built on a pre-existing structure of related perceptions and actions’, is hardly debatable, and yet 
it is debated by some (e.g., Chomsky31). This suggests that Wittgenstein underestimates the 
potential for even the obvious to be a cause of debate and controversy. It is perhaps to the extent 
that what may seem incontestable (e.g., PI §244) is in fact contested by some, that it may be 
called a thesis (thereby also pre-empting accusations of dogmatism). 
 In fact, the passage responsible for the consensus that Wittgenstein believed no theses 
can be advanced in philosophy should be reread: ‘If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, 
it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them’ (PI §128). 
What Wittgenstein is saying here is not that there cannot be any philosophical theses, but that 
should there be, they would be, or so he believes, non-debatable and uncontroversial.  
Does this mean that what philosophy advances is just trivial? Wittgenstein said as much 
to Moore: 
 
[Wittgenstein] said that he was not trying to teach us any new facts: that 
he would only tell us ‘trivial’ things – ‘things which we know already’; but 
that the difficult thing was to get a ‘synopsis’ of these trivialities […]. He said 
it was misleading to say that what we wanted was an ‘analysis’, since in 
science to "analyse" water means to discover some new fact about it, e.g. that 
it is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, whereas in philosophy ‘we know at 
the start all the facts we need to know’ (MWL 114) 
 
Wittgenstein’s explanations are as removed from scientific, scientistic or metaphysical 
speculation as can be but look across his desk, he did. For there can be no doubt that 
Wittgenstein came to (and was consequently able to bring us) his revolutionary views on 
language, meaning, action, mentality by observing human behaviour and practices. 
Wittgenstein would have to look across his desk, observe our form of life, to say things such 
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as: ‘… we can regard behaviour as dissimulation only under particular circumstances. (LW I, 
252; my emphasis); 'Just try – in a real case – to doubt someone else's fear or pain' (PI 303; 
my emphasis); ‘There is an unmistakable expression of joy and its opposite. ... there are cases 
where only a lunatic could take the expression of pain, for instance, as sham.’ (LW II, 32-33; 
emphasis in the original); ‘The words "I am happy" are a bit of the behaviour of joy’ (RPP I, 
450). These, however, are not to be taken as conclusions he comes to about what he sees, but 
as descriptions that can’t be argued with. That such realism did not explanatorily enter into his 
conceptual elucidations, did not turn into an empiricism (that is, that he did not turn his 
observations into justifications) does not mean it did not impact his thought and infiltrate all 
aspects of his philosophy .32  
 Of course, it cannot be excluded that Wittgenstein might have ventured into explanation 
against his will:  
 
I struggle again and again – whether successfully I do not know – against the tendency 
in my own mind to set up (construct) rules in philosophy, to make suppositions 
(hypotheses) instead of just seeing what is there (MS 108, Vol. IV, 160) 
 
Yet, even such passages do not rule out that the kind of explanation he struggled to avoid was 
only the scientistic kind, and that this leaves coherent room in Wittgenstein’s philosophy for 
both the conceptual and the theoretical, thinly rendered. Perhaps the temptation for the latter – 
which we might call simple explanation – was too great to pass up, particularly as it makes so 
obvious the idleness of explanations that involve speculative metaphysics or the fabrication of 
ghostly processes. Simple explanation thus became an extension of the perspicuous 
presentations of a philosopher aware of all the wrong ways of importing explanation into 
philosophy. Indeed, non-theory-laden, perspicuous explanation is the only kind of explanation 
that should be expected from a clear philosophical vision. 
  
7. Stop quieting Wittgenstein! 
 
As I hope to have shown, neither Therapeutism nor linguistic reductivism can be pinned on 
Wittgenstein. Perceptions of his philosophy as fenced in by language and unconcerned by the 
connection between word and world are unwarranted. So are perceptions of his view and 
practice of philosophy as only, or mainly, about therapy, dissolution and deconstruction. Of 
course, no one would want to deny the therapeutic aspect in Wittgenstein’s philosophy: there 
are elements in it of working on oneself and the purging of false pictures and the dissolution of 
false problems; but it is wrong to reduce it to that. Therapeutism misrepresents Wittgenstein 
for whom the therapeutic method was not, and was never claimed to be, his only or even 
preferred method of doing philosophy; indeed, by his own affirmation: ‘there is not a 
philosophical method’ (PI §133).  
John McDowell attempts to make Wittgenstein’s quietism less ‘idle’ by flagging it as 
‘an activity of diagnosing, so as to explain away some appearances that we are confronted with 
genuine problems’. If successful, the ‘supposed problems disappear, leaving no need for theory 
construction to make things ‘less mysterious’’ (2009, 371). However, McDowell fails to see 
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that Wittgenstein did not stop at diagnostic activity, but was in the business of problem-solving, 
and not only dissolving: ‘If I am correct, then philosophical problems must be completely 
solvable, in contrast to all others’ (BT 181); ‘If one doesn’t want to SOLVE philosophical 
problems – why doesn’t one give up dealing with them?’ (LW ii, 84; emphasis in the original).   
Generating and perpetuating the myth of a quietist Wittgenstein has contributed to 
mainstream philosophy’s depreciation of a great philosopher. 33  Far from being a neutral 
bystander in the realm of philosophy, Wittgenstein is a militant, interventionist philosopher 
whose positive contributions to philosophy, psychology, psychotherapy, education theory, 
anthropology, primatology, sociology, aesthetics and the cognitive sciences must be 
recognized, applied and celebrated. On Wittgenstein’s view, philosophy does not leave 
everything as it is, for philosophy or for the sciences: it destroys houses of cards and rearranges 
the jaded familiar so it can become perspicuous to us; it demystifies where there is confusion 
and bewitchment; it elucidates where language has gone on holiday; it helps us revise our 
misconceptions and see things aright, thereby reorienting our philosophical and scientific 
paths. Wittgenstein’s impact outside philosophy has been more resonant and acknowledged 
than within.34 Indeed, the recent protest by psychologists against the BBC’s general perception 
of the mental as all in the brain, signals the recognized influence of his thought on psychology: 
‘by "psychological" I don’t mean "inner"‘ (RPP ii, 612).     
  To proclaim Wittgenstein’s quietism – for better or for worse – is to attempt to silence 
the revolutionary and constructive impact he has made, and can still make, to our 
understanding of ourselves. Peter Hacker has tirelessly made clear, and rightly so, that 
Wittgenstein’s agenda was interventionist: 
 
Although Wittgenstein has sometimes been misinterpreted as a 
philosophical quietist, nothing, could be further from the truth. For it is 
Wittgenstein who, for the first time in the history of our subject, has explained 
why philosophy has a license to interfere in the sciences. For scientists are no 
less liable to conceptual confusions than anyone else, and scientific theorizing 
is as liable to conceptual entanglement as any other intellectual endeavour. 
(Hacker 2013, 19) 
 
Philosophical contribution to the sciences requires keeping up with, and correcting how 
scientists conceptually engage in their business; it does not involve adding to their knowledge 
base. And so Wittgenstein has not trespassed the thick dividing line between science and 
philosophy, but contributed to the sciences, he has – and will continue to do.35  
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1 It is this sense of explanation – the scientific sense – that, when practised by philosophers, 
Wittgenstein (and this paper) counters. Of course, not all explanation (pace strong explanatory 
scientism of the kind upheld by Stephen Hawking) is scientific (e.g., the explanation of a 
word’s meaning), and Wittgenstein often alludes to a thinner sense of explanation which 
amounts to a re-description. This is related, but only partly, to what he refers to as ‘further 
descriptions’ rather than explanation, as what is called for, say in aesthetics, ethics and 
philosophy (MWL 106). On this, see Cioffi (1998; 2007) and Schroeder (1993).  
2 Wittgenstein’s closest precursor here is Nietzsche, in his criticism of metaphysics as the 
postulation of some deep, underlying entity that can explain phenomena. 
3  TLP 2.18: ‘logical form, i.e. the form of reality’. 
4 Metaphysics is not altogether abandoned by Hume: ‘we must cultivate true metaphysics 
carefully, in order to destroy metaphysics of the false and adulterated kind’ (1748, 5).  
5  Particularly as practised by Newton with his anti-hypothetical stance. Recall Newton’s 
famous phrase, ‘hypotheses non fingo’ (I don’t feign / invent hypotheses), which suggests that 
hypotheses should be based on observation, not speculation. 
6 Here is an account of Wittgenstein’s description of his practice of philosophy, by G. E. 
Moore: ‘I was a good deal surprised by some of the things he [Wittgenstein] said about the 
difference between “philosophy” in the sense in which what he was doing might be called 
“philosophy” (he called this “modern philosophy”), and what has traditionally been called 
“philosophy”. He said that what he was doing was a “new subject”, and not merely a stage in 
a “continuous development”; that there was now, in philosophy, a “kink” in the “development 
of human thought”, comparable to that which occurred when Galileo and his contemporaries 
invented dynamics; that a “new method” had been discovered as has happened when 
“chemistry was developed out of alchemy”; and that it was now possible for the first time that 
there should be “skilful” philosophers, though of course there had in the past been “great” 
philosophers. He went on to say that, though philosophy had now been “reduced to a matter of 
skill”, yet this skill, like other skills, is very difficult to acquire. One difficulty was that it 
required a “sort of thinking” to which we are not accustomed and to which we have not been 
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trained – a sort of thinking very different from what is required in the sciences. […] he also 
said that the “new subject” did really resemble what had been traditionally called “philosophy” 
in the three respects that (1) it was very general, (2) it was fundamental both to ordinary life 
and to the sciences, and (3) it was independent of any special results of science; that therefore 
the application to it of the word “philosophy” was not purely arbitrary. He did not expressly 
try to tell us exactly what the “new method” which had been found was. But he gave some 
hints as to its nature. He said […] that the “new subject consisted in ‘something like putting in 
order our notions as to what can be said about the world’, and compared this to the tidying up 
of a room where you have to move the same object several times before you can get the room 
really tidy. He said also that we were “in a muddle about things”, which we had to try to clear 
up’ (MWL 113-14; emphasis added). That Galileo is also the ‘father of modern observational 
astronomy’ – being the first to turn the telescope towards the stars and getting our first 
perspicuous view of them – is another good reason to see in him Wittgenstein’s scientific 
counterpart.  
7 This vision of Wittgenstein – which I am calling Therapeutism – was promoted by the New 
Wittgensteinians, thus called because of the title of what might be called their manifesto 
volume, The New Wittgenstein (Routledge, 2000). Notable ‘New Wittgensteinians’ are Cora 
Diamond, James Conant, Alice Crary and Rupert Read.  
8 See, for example, Hutchinson & Read (2006, 5).  
9  Peter Hacker has abundantly shown the untenability of the Therapeutic (also known as 
‘Resolute’ or ‘New Wittgensteinian’) reading of the Tractatus. See ‘Was he trying to whistle 
it?’ and ‘When the whistling had to stop’, reprinted in Hacker 2001. 
10 Here is an example of the distinction: ‘What I am aiming at is also found in the difference 
between the casual observation “I know that that’s a...”, as it might be used in ordinary life, and 
the same utterance when a philosopher makes it’; ‘For when Moore says “I know that that’s 
a...” I want to reply “you don’t know anything!” – and yet I would not say that to anyone who 
was speaking without philosophical intention’ (OC §§406-407). 
11  Remember his remark to Moore that philosophy as he newly conceived it resembled 
traditional philosophy in being ‘fundamental both to ordinary life and to the sciences’ (MWL 
113). 
12 I will use these more or less interchangeably throughout the paper, as Wittgenstein often 
does. Note that Wittgenstein uses ‘grammar’ as a generic term for the rules or conditions that 
determine sense (PG 88). 
13 Certainly Hume did not underestimate it: ‘the chief obstacle … to our improvement in the 
moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms’ (E 
45).  
14 See Gennaro (n.d.). William Seager’s worry that ‘despite recent strides in neuroscience and 
psychology that have deepened understanding of the brain, consciousness remains one of the 
greatest philosophical and scientific puzzles’ is telling (2016, i).  
15 See Tejedor (2017). 
16  For a discussion of Wittgenstein’s impact on neuropsychology’s correction of its 
misconceived storage and imprint models of memory, see Moyal-Sharrock (2009). 
17 Which is not to say that this is the classification that lies ‘in the order of things’, but that it 
is the most logically (grammatically) adequate. And of course, there can be different 
classifications (or assembling of reminders) of the phenomena, relative to the philosopher’s 
particular purpose (cf. PI §127). 
18 I argue this, with Wittgenstein as a case in point, in Moyal-Sharrock (2016a). 
19  ‘We are interested in language as a procedure according to explicit rules, because 
philosophical problems are misunderstandings which must be removed by clarification of the 
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rules according to which we are inclined to use words. We consider language from one point 
of view only.’ (PG 32) 
20 Wittgenstein is clear that there is a correspondence between concepts / grammar and very 
general facts of nature’ (PPF 365; RPP i, 46): ‘A natural foundation for the way [a] concept is 
formed is the complex nature and the variety of human contingencies’ (RPP ii, 614); ‘The rule 
we lay down is the one most strongly suggested by the facts of experience’ (AWL 84); ‘The 
language-game with colours is characterized by what we can do and what we cannot do’ (Z 
§345).  
21 See Moyal-Sharrock (2016a). 
22 This classificatory aim is essentially no different from Crane’s search for ‘the categories to 
which conscious phenomena belong’ in his New Directions in the Study of the Mind, only 
Crane’s project attempts to chart the elements of the ontology of consciousness 
(http://www.timcrane.com/new-directions.html).  
23 This seems contestable for we ordinarily speak of love as a feeling. Yet remember that 
philosophy is not there to interfere or correct ordinary usage but only to clarify it 
philosophically, put philosophical order in the disorder of our concepts. 
24 ‘“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” – It is 
what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is 
not agreement in opinions but in form of life’ (PI §241). 
25 See Child (2017). 
26 I owe this new way of characterising homunculi or ghosts in the machine to Peter Tse, brain 
neuroscientist, who likens what happens when someone is asked to think of their mother’s 
maiden name as their saying: ‘Elves in the basement, give me my mother’s maiden name’ and 
it appeared in their consciousness (BBC The Forum, 27 January 2015).  
27 How, it may be objected, can one remind someone of something they never knew? I take 
‘reminder’ here to mean something like ‘bringing to mind or to our attention’ something that 
we had seen (that was right under our eyes) without registering or paying attention to it. 
28 ‘A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and 
language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably’ (PI §115). 
29 See Cooper (2017). 
30  Lars Hertzberg (1992) distinguishes two senses in Wittgenstein’s use of the notion of 
‘primitive’: a logical sense, indicating the place occupied by a type of reaction or utterance in 
relation to a language-game; and an anthropological sense, connected with understanding the 
place of a reaction in the life of a human being. I would add: in the history of the human species 
– and so: primitive in the phylogenetic sense as well. 
31 As Chomsky would also hotly debate Wittgenstein’s leitmotif that ‘In the beginning is the 
deed’ – as also would philosophers who hold representations or propositions as basic to 
thought. 
32 ‘Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy, that is the hardest thing’ (RFM vi, 23, p. 
325). 
33 As argued, for example, in Pascal Engel ‘The trouble with W*ttg*ns**n’ Rivista di Estica, 
Homagio a Diego Marconi, 2007, 11-26. Also, Michael Lynch’s reply to Paul Horwich where 
Lynch questions the validity for philosophy of an overly narrow view of philosophical therapy 
(‘Of Flies and Philosophers: Wittgenstein and Philosophy’ 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/05/of-flies-and-philosophers-wittgenstein-and-
philosophy/). 
34  See Moyal-Sharrock (2016b) for an appreciation of Wittgenstein’s current impact on 
philosophy and outside of philosophy.  
35 This paper has been a few years in the making; I owe its closure to a question put to me in 
conversation by Peter Hacker at the Laurence Goldstein Memorial conference in Kent (2015). 
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